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AGENDAS AND CONSUMER CHOICE
ABSTRACT
Suppose a consumer is asked first to choose among "foreign" vs. "domestic"
automobiles and then, depending on his choice, to choose within the class of
"foreign" (or "domestic") automobiles. Will such a restriction influence choice
probabilities?
This paper investigates the relationships between such hierarchical
constraints, cognitive processing rules, the attribute (or aspect) structure of
choice alternatives, and choice probabilities. We base our analyses on three
well-known and empirically documented probablistic choice models: the constant
ratio model (CRM), elimination-by-aspects (EBA), and a generalization of the
hierarchical elimination model (GEM); An agenda (either implicit or imposed) is
then a constraining hierarchy. It can be "top down" (as above), "bottom up" (as a
tournament), or more general We provide behavioral hypotheses suggesting when
various types of self-imposed agendas will be used by consumers.
Our first set of analytic results identifies which choice rules are affected
by agendas and on which aspect structures. Our second set of results illustrates
how agendas can be used to enhance target products. And our third set of results
shows that two commonly accepted axioms of choice behavior, dominance and
regularity, need not apply on agendas and that such violations make intuitive
sense and are useful managerially.
Throughout this paper we provide examples and discuss the implications of our
results for marketing management and for behavioral research.
1. MOTIVATION
Agendas influence choice. For example, academic hiring decisions are
sometimes made as sequential decisions. If there are many good candidates for a
junior faculty position and we do not wish to interview them all, we may first
decide on a subfield, say information processing, and then search within that
subfield. We make our decision on subfields based on our prior experience which
tells us what to expect from the type of candidates that choose to enter that
subfield. Contrast this "top down" sequential decision (subfield, then candidate
within subfield), with a "bottom up" sequential decision such as might be used in
a field where it is feasible to interview all of the potentially good candidates.
For example, if there are relatively few candidates, we may interview them all,
decide who is the best "model builder", who is the best "consumer behavioralist",
and who is the best "managerial analyst". We would then contrast the best with
the best taking into consideration all of the candidates' characteristics as well
as their fields of interest.
Unlike voting agendas, where the agenda setter seeks to influence the outcome
(e.g., see Farquharson 1969), hiring committees may or may not wish to influence
the outcome by their choice of agenda. Members of hiring committeees may not even
vary in terms of preferences. Often the sequential decision rule, i.e., the
agenda, is chosen to structure or simplify the task. The committee may be unaware
of whether the agenda influences the probabilities of outcomes.
Sequential decision rules may also apply to individual choice. Consider the
following print advertisements that appeared recently:
PITNEY BOWES - If you have $5,000 or $6,000 earmarked for a Savin desk copier
or a Xerox 3100, you can spend it on a full-sized copier
(Pitney Bowes) and still have money left over.
SAVIN - If Savin couldn't make a copying system better than the Xerox
4500, we wouldn't have bothered.
XEROX - 2,995 for a what? (With visuals of the machine and the Xerox
trademark).
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One can interpret these advertisements as an attempt by the manufacturers to
influence the sequential decision process used by buyers of copying machines.
Presumably, Pitney Bowes believes it benefits by influencing consumers to make a
decision of {Pitney Bowes, Savin, Xerox} vs. {all others}, while Savin
prefers the decision of Savin, Xerox} vs. {all others}. Xerox tries to
prevent such sequential decisions.
The effect of an advertising campaign is not identical to the effect of the
sequential decision process used by hiring committees. Advertising can, at best,
influence the decision process, not set it. Furthermore, it is an empirical
question whether or not the consumer actually follows a sequential decision
process. Finally, an agenda effect may be only one of many outcomes of an
advertising campaign. Nonetheless, there are similarities and it would be useful
to know whether sequential decision processes influence consumer choice. Such
knowledge would help us analyze and design communication strategies, such as
advertising, which appear to influence sequential decision processes,
New product strategies also can influence and/or depend upon consumers'
sequential decision processes. For example, consider market entry strategy.
Selecting the "right" market to enter greatly enhances the likelihood and
magnitude of a new product success. Selecting the wrong market can doom a new
product to failure. One component of market selection is the identification of
market structure such as the simplified hypothetical market structure for
televisions shown in figure 1. If, as shown, the consumer first chooses or can be
influenced to choose among 'consoles' and 'portables' then among 'color' and
'black & white', a manufacturer of color consoles might favor color portables over
black & white consoles so he can compete in both "markets" and not cannibalize his
existing product line. Once such market structure is understood, the innovating
firm can better select a market on the basis of sales potential, penetration,
scale, input, reward, risk, and match to the organization's capabilities (e.g.,
see Urban and Hauser 1980).
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Consoles Portables
'Color B&W Color B&W
Figure : SimpZlified Hypothetical Hierarchy for TeLevision Markets
There are a myriad of other interesting, relevant situations where individual
consumers are faced with sequential decision processes. In shopping behavior a
consumer limits his set of product options by choosing one particular shopping
center. The industrial salesman often tries to influence customer's consideration
sets; supermarkets use displays to set one brand away from others; package goods
manfactules often use similar packaging (compare Colgate to Close-Up toothpaste)
or distinct packaging; and some advertisements mention competitive products,
others do not. Some of these strategies are planned, some dictated by
environmental constraints, and some serendipitous. But in each case the sequence
of decisions among products is influenced and in each case the modification of the
decision sequence may or may not affect choice outcomes.
We can better understand and model these marketing strategies if we first
understand the effects of sequential processing on choice. By drawing on and
extending recent developments in probabilistic choice theory, this paper explores
a mathematical analysis of sequential decision processes, i.e., agendas, and their
ability to influence consumers' probabilities of choice. We begin with a short
discussion of research that addresses issues related to the issues we address in
this paper.
In marketing, agendas have been studied by researchers seeking to influence
market entry strategy with normative models that identify market structure. See
review by Day, Shocker, and Srivastava (1980). Perhaps the best known example is
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the Hendry system, described in Kalwani and Morrison (1977), which defines market
structure relative to theoretical probabilities of switching among products. The
identified agenda is based on a comparison of theoretical and observed switching
probabilities. In a related method, Rao and Sabavala (1981) use hierarchical
cluster analysis on switching probabilities with the assumption that switching is
greatest at the lowest levels in the hierarchy. Srivastava, Shocker, and Leone
(1981) apply a similar method to data which measures substitution-in-use. Urban,
Johnson, and Hauser (1984) make the same switching assumption but use forced
switching data. They remove a consumer's most preferred product from a simulated
store and observe subsequent behavior. In each of these methodologies, the
concern is a description of the market, not necessarily the individual consumer.
In social choice economics, researchers have dealt primarily with voting
agendas. Plott and Levine (1978) develop a descriptive model of "naive" voter
behavior and illustrate that it fits empirical data quite well. McKelvey (1981)
adapts this model to identify a "best" agenda via dynamic programming. In
alternative models, Farquharson (1969) and McKelvey and Niemi (1978) assume
"sophisticated" voters who have perfect information about every other voters'
preferences. These authors show that unique alternatives will be selected for
binary agendas.
Our present approach differs from the approaches in these literatures. Unlike
the social choice theorists, we deal with descriptive, probabilistic models of
individual choice where the individual either is faced with a constrained agenda
or uses an implicit agenda.
Unlike the market structure literature, we do not begin by defining agendas
relative to the likelihood of switching among products. Rather, we investigate
how such definitions and other properties are related to more primitive
assumptions of cognitive processing and its relationship to sequential and random
decision structures.
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Our purpose is to construct and investigate a mathematical representation, or
theory, of how sequential cognitive decision rules affect individual choice
probabilities. We take as our basis, existing psychological models of choice
behavior, models that have been used successfully (e.g., Tversky 1972 and Tversky
and Sattath 1979) to describe and explain how individuals make choices among sets
of choice objects. Because we are using these models in new ways, we need to make
some generalizations, but we attempt to limit our generalizations so that our
model clearly reduces to existing models when the choice situation is identical to
that which has been studied previously. Furthermore, we do investigate a series
of models which together bracket the types of hypotheses likely to be made about
individual choice behavior.
We investigate and extend three decision rules: the constant ratio model
(CRM), elimination by aspects (EBA), and the hierarchical elimination model
(HEM). We investigate their relationship to decision sequences and provide
testable hypotheses as to when a decision rule would be used by an individual.
Our analyses indicate when alternative decision rules provide different choice
probabilities and when they do not, when and how agendas affect choice
probabilities, and how all of these results depend on the structure of
interrelationships among choice objects.
Because we rely heavily on the recent literature in mathematical psychology,
section 2 reviews the models we use in this paper. Section 3 defines an agenda
and investigates its relationship to the choice probabilities. Section 4 explores
the relationships among agendas and product attributes (aspects). Section 5
provides some illustrative results on when agendas are effective strategically.
Section 6 discusses dominance and regularity and section 7 concludes with a
discussion of limitations, extensions, and suggested experiments.
Throughout the text, we motivate the results with examples. All mathematical
proofs are in the appendix.
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2. PROBABILISTIC MODELS OF INDIVIDUAL CHOICE BEHAVIOR
Our review is by necessity concise. We seek to provide a basic review (1)
because some readers may not be familiar with the details of these models, (2) our
generalizations must be put in perspective, and (3) the remainder of this paper
depends upon these models. Those readers wishing greater detail are referred to
Luce (1959, 1977), Tversky (1972a, b) and particularly, Tversky and Sattath
(1979). Those readers already familiar with these models may wish to skip this
section pausing only to review notation.
We use lower case English letters r, s, t, v, w, x, y, and z to denote choice
objects, e.g., automobiles, restaurants, and televisions. We use upper case
English letters, A, B, C, ..., to denote sets of choice objects, e.g., A = x, y, z}.
The total finite set of all choice objects being studied is denoted by T, and the null
set is denoted by 0,
Let P(xjA) denote the probability that object x is chosen when the choice set
is A. Naturally we assume P(xIA) > 0 and the sum of all P(xlA) for all x in A
is equal to 1.0.
We describe choice objects as a collection of aspects. For example, an
automobile may be described by aspects such as 'sporty', 'high mpg', 'sedan',
'front wheel drive', 'Chevrolet', etc. An aspect is a binary descriptor of a
choice object, e.g., 'sedan', in the sense that a choice object either has an
aspect or it does not. We use lower case Greek letters, a, X, y, ..., to
denote aspects. For continuous attributes such as mpg, we define ranges. For
example, an automobile with the attribute of 30 or more mpg, would have the aspect
'high mpg'. An aspect in this analysis can be a collection of more elementary
aspects, e.g., 'high mpg, front wheel drive, sporty, and red', or it can be that
which is unique to a choice object, e.g., 'Honda Accordness'.
Let x' = {a, 1,...} be the set of aspects associated with choice
alternative x. For any set of choice alternatives, A, let A' be the set of
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aspects that belong to at least one alternative in A; i.e., A' = {alax' for
some tA) . For any aspect, a, and set of choice alternatives, A, let A
denote the set of all choice alternatives in A that have aspect a, i.e.,
A = {xlxA, ax')}. Note that A' is a set of aspects and A is a
set of choice objects. For example, if A = {Honda Civic, Honda Accord,
Chevrolet Chevette, Chevrolet Citation}, then A' = {'compact', 'front wheel
drive', 'Honda', 'Chevrolet', ...}. If a = 'Honda', then A ({Honda
Civic, Honda Accord).
The best way to think of an aspect is as a unit of analysis. If
attribute-like aspects, such as 'compact', 'front wheel drive', etc. are
sufficient to describe the choice process for strategic managerial understanding,
then we prefer to work with them since they have intuitive appeal to the manager.
However, it is not necessary that we be able to name the aspects. We can also
think of aspects as descriptors of unique components of sets of choice objects.
Aspects can be 'that which is unique to a Chevy Chevette', or 'that which is
shared by a Chevy Chevette and a Chevy Citation and no other car', etc. In such a
specification, we could have an aspect for every possible subset of T, that is,
2n-2 aspects for objects. Both interpretations of aspects are consistent
with our mathematical analysis. In fact, they would also be semantically
equivalent if the manager could only articulate more elementary descriptors of
'that which is shared by a Chevy Chevette and a Chevy Citation and no other car'.
Throughout the paper we use attribute-like aspects for our examples recognizing
that our results apply equally well to the interpretation based on subsets of
choice objects.
Constant Ratio ModeZ (CRM) . Perhaps the most commonly used probabilitic choice
model in marketing is the constant ratio model. See Bell, Keeney, Little (1975);
Hauser and Urban (1977); Jeuland, Bass, Wright (1980); Johnson (1975); Luce (1959,
1977); McFadden (1980); Pessemier (1977); Punj and Staelin (1978); Silk and Urban
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(1978); and others. The basic assumption underlying the CRM is that the ratio of
(non-zero) choice probabilities for two objects is independent of the choice set.
Mathematically, P(xJA)/P(ylA) = P(xjB)/P(yJB) for all A and B such that the
probabilities are non-zero. It is easily shown e.g., Luce (1977), that CRM
implies there exist some scale values, u(x), for the objects, x, such that:
P(x[A) = u(x) (1)
Z u y)
yeA
where yeA denotes all objects, y, contained in choice set A. The simplicity of
equation 1 has led to its wide acceptance. Furthermore, in many situations, it
approximates behavior quite well. For example, Silk and Urban (1978) have
forecast market share to within one or two percentage points on over 400 new
products using a model that incorporates equation 1. See evidence in Urban and
Katz (1983).
However, several authors (Debreu 1960; Luce and Suppes 1965; Restle 1961;
Rumelhart and Greeno 1971; Tversky 1972b) have presented conceptual and empirical
evidence that CRM fails to account for the similarity among choice objects. For
example, consider four automobiles, xl, x2, Yl, Y2 Assume xl and x2
are identical except for an unimportant aspect, say the type of electric clock,
analog or digital, respectively. Automobile yl is quite different from x1 and
x2, but Y2 is the same as yl except for a very popular feature such as
cruise control. All four automobiles are priced identically. Suppose that an
individual is indifferent between x1 and yl. Then, since xl and x2 are
virtually identical, we expect P(xll{xl, x2 }) = 1/2, P(xll{xl, Y1 }) = 1/2,
and P(x2 1{x 2, y1 ) = 1/2, but P(y 2 1{Yl y2 ) = 1. It follows from CRM (equation 1) tha
P(yl1 {xl, x2 , Y1 }) = 1/3. However, common sense suggests the choice is more likely
among x-cars and y-cars. Consequently, we expect P(yll{xl, x2, Y1 }) to be close to
1/2 and the other two trinary probabilities close to 1/4 rather than all equal to
1/3 as predicted by CRM.
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Furthermore, CRM implies if two automobiles are substitutable in one context
they are substitutable in all contexts. Thus, if P(y2 1{yl,y2}) = 1,
then CRM implies P(y2J{x l,y2}) 1. Again, common sense suggests such a
result is implausible. The addition of cruise control is unlikely to eliminate
all conflict among automobile x, say the Toyota Celica, and automobile y, say the
Buick Skyhawk.
Elimination by Aspects (EBA). The above criticisms are formulated with
appeals to common sense based on similarities among the characteristics, or
aspects, of the choice objects. Elimination by aspects addresses these criticisms
by postulating that choices among sets of objects depend upon the aspects of the
objects not the objects per se. This assumption is analogous to the economic
models of Lancaster (1971) and his colleagues and to the multiattributed models in
marketing as reviewed by Wilkie and Pessemier (1973).
EBA postulates that an individual chooses among all aspects in the offered
set, A', with probability proportional to the scale value of the aspect. He then
eliminates all choice objects not having the chosen aspect and continues choosing
aspects and eliminating objects until one choice object is left.
If a represents the scale value of aspect a, then EBA is given
mathematically by the following recursive equation:
P(xIA) = a . P(xjA ) (2)
Bx3A'
It is easy to show that any aspect common to all alternatives in a choice set,
e.g., the aspect 'automobiles', does not affect choice probabilities and will,
therefore, be discarded. See Tversky (1972a, 1972b).
To illustrate EBA, we consider four automobiles x = Honda Civic, y = Honda
Accord, z = Chevrolet Chevette, and w = Chevrolet Citation. Let a = 'Automobile',
3 = 'Japanese', y = 'American', 6 = aspects unique to the Honda Civic, = aspects
unique to the Honda Accord, X = aspects unique to the Chevrolet Chevette, and
n = aspects unique to the Chevrolet Citation. According to our definitions:
-9-
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X' = {a(, a, }
y' {a, 3,}
z' = , X}
w' = {a, Y, n}
The aspect, a, is common to all objects and can be ignored. Alternative x will
then be chosen if is the first aspect chosen or if is the first aspect
chosen and then 6 is chosen from the set ({, p}. Specifically:
P(xlix, y, , w}) = 6 + . P(xl{x, y}) (3)
=6+, . 6
d +R
where, without loss of generality, we have set $+ + + / + + = 1.
To illustrate how EBA resolves the conceptual criticisms of CRM, set
a = unique aspects of Toyota Celica, = unique aspects of Buick Skyhawk,
Y1 = digital clock, y2 = analog clock, and 6 = cruise control. Then,
xY' = { y 1 }
x' = {a, Y 2 }Y1 {
y2 2(, 6}Y2 fat
Suppose a = , Y1 = Y2 , and Y1 , Y2 , and are small compared to cc and B.
Then equation 2 yields: P(yll {x l, x2 ' Y1}) ) = /( + o + y + 2) /(a + ) = 1/2.
Similarly, P(y2 1{xl, y2}) = (+5)/(f++a+yl1) = /(Ct+f) = 1/2.
We leave it to the reader to show that all other binary and trinary probabilities
are as expected by common sense.
EBA is a generalization of CRM because equation 2 reduces to equation 1, with
u(x) = x, , when choice objects are disjoint, i.e., x'fy' = 0 for all
x, yeA.
Finally, note that EBA does not imply a fixed sequential decision process.
Rather, EBA implies that the individual probabilistically selects aspects for
consideration and, hence, EBA is a randomized sequential decision process.
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Preference Trees
By 1985 there were over 160 different automobiles available. The number of
aspects necessary to fully describe and distinguish these automobiles could be
very large. For example, if there were an aspect for every possible subset, a
fully specified EBA model would require approximately 1.5 x 1048 aspects. At
the other extreme is CRM, which applies when objects have no shared aspects. CRM
requires only as many scale values as there are choice objects, in this case 160
scale values.
Tversky and Sattath (1979) investigate an intermediate level of complexity in
the structure of aspect sets. They investigate tree structures known as
preference trees. An example preference tree is shown in figure 2.
L
:an
Chevrolet
.tte
Civic Accord
Figure 2: Example Preference Tree for AutomobiZes
A preference tree is an aspect structure which is a hierarchical aspect
structure where there is no overlap among the branches. For example, in figure 2
there are Japanese and American automobiles. The Japanese cars are further
subdivided into Hondas and Toyotas and the American cars are subdivided into
Buicks and Chevrolets. The addition of an American Honda say if consumers considered
Hondas built in America as American, would introduce overlap and upset the tree
structure. (See formal definition of preference trees in Tversky and Sattath 1979).
A preference tree structure greatly restricts the complexity of the inter-
relationships among aspects. The 2 -2 possible aspects are limited to at most
2n-2 aspects corresponding to the maximal number of links in a tree with n
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terminal nodes. For example, in a choice set with 10 objects, the number of
aspects possible are reduced from 1,022 to 138. Thus, preference trees represent a
compromise between the generality of unrestricted EBA and the limitations of CM.
Nonetheless, preference trees can adequately represent many interesting choice
situations. For example, the structured choice set, {xl, x2, y1 Y2} ,
shown above is the preference tree in figure 3. (The vertical length of the
branch indicates the importance of the feature.)
Celica (a) Skyhawk ()
I,
,b1.--- ----- \, ''1 *Analog
clock (y 2 )
xl1 2 Y1 Cruise control ()
Y2
Figure 3: Preference Tree Representation of the Logical Counterexample to the
Constant Ratio ModeZ.
HierarchicalZ EZimination ModeZs (HEM)
Neither CRM nor FBA are sequential decision rules. Preference trees are
aspect structures, not decision rules. However, there is empirical evidence that
individuals make explicit, hierarchical decisions. See among others Bettman
(1979), Haines (1974), and Payne (1976).
In 1979, Tversky and Sattath introduced the hierarchical elimination model
(HEM) to represent cognitive processing on a preference tree as a hierarchical
series of choice points. The idea is that the individual sequentially compares
sets of objects defined by branches in the preference tree. For example, in
figure 2 he first decides among 'Japanese' and 'American' automobiles, then, if he
selects 'Japanese', he chooses among 'Hondas' and 'Toyotas', and finally, if he
selects 'Hondas', he chooses among 'Civics' and 'Accords'. The choice among
branches is proportional to the measures of the aspects in that branch. For
example, if a = 'Japanese', 3 - 'American'. y = 'Honda', 6 = 'Toyota',
- 12 -
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- ''Buick', X = 'Chevrolet', = 'Civic', and = 'Accord', then the
probability he chooses the 'Japanese' branch is:
P(JapaneselT) = (a+ Y+ 6 + + (4a)
(a + y + 6 + +7) + (+P +X)
The probability he then chooses the Honda subbranch is:
P('Honda'I'Japanese') Y + 4 + 7 (4b)
(Y+ + 7) +d
and
P('Civic'j'Honda') = (4c)
The overall probability is the product of the sequential conditional
probabilities, i.e.,
P('Civic'IT) = P('Civic'I'Honda')P('Honda'j'Japanese')P('Japanese'IT) (4d)
In other words, if Al, A2, ... , T is a sequence of choice sets such
that Ai is contained in Ai+l and if the sequence corresponds to-the branching
in the preference tree, then a hierarchical probability model is given by:
P(xA) = P(xIA 1)P(AlA 2) *.. P(A,_lAlI)P(AI T ) (5)
where A denotes the hierarchy.
For a preference tree, HEM is defined such that
P(xAl) = m(x) (6a)
C m(y)
ye A1
P(AilAi+ ) m(Ai) (6b)
i m(B)
BcAi+1
where m(Ai) denotes the measure of A and BAi+1 indicates the sum is over
all branches B of the set Ai+1. The measure of Ai is equal to the sum of all
aspects in Ai except those shared by all other branches in A i+l The measure
of x is the sum of all aspects of x except those shared by all objects in A.
For example, in figure 2 and equation 4, m('Civic') = 4, m('Accord') = 7,
m('Honda') = Y + + 77, m('Toyota') = 6, etc.
- 13 -
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To see how HEM resolves the conceptual criticisms of CRM, we apply HEM to the
preference tree in figure 3. Using equations 5 and 6 and the definitions of ,
, Y1' and Y2 for that figure, we obtain:
P(ylj{xl, x2, Y1 })= /(a+f+Y1 +Y 2 ) / = 1/2
Pi{X1X· X2, ·Y1 )= 1+y . Y1 r1
+Y 2+ / \ Y2Y1+
Clearly, HEM and EBA are very different cognitive decision rules.
Intuitively, we would not expect them to yield the same choice probabilities.
However, the reader may wish to verify that for the preference tree in figure 3,
the forecast choice probabilities are the same for EBA and HEM. Tversky and
Sattath (1979, p. 548) prove the surprising result that for any preference tree,
EBA and HEM yield the same choice probabilities. Thus, on a preference tree, we
could never distinguish the two alternative decision rules by simply observing
choice probabilities. (However, we might distinguish them by other means such as
verbal protocols or choice reaction time.) V
To date, HEM has only bn defined for preference trees. The preference tree
defines a natural sequence of decisions. We now extend the preference
tree/hierarchical elimination concepts to general aspect structures, general
sequential decisions and to imposed sequential constraints on choice decisions.
3. AGENDAS
If the aspect structure forms a preference tree and the consumer follows HEM,
then we can think of the choice process as following a sequence of constraints.
That is, the consumer first chooses a set, i, from among subsets of T, next
he (or she) chooses a set, A 1' from among the subsets of A,
proceeding until he (or she) finally chooses an object, x, from the choice set
Al. The choice sequence is illustrated in figure 4 where the nodes represent
choices. We have numbered the nodes to indicate the order of processing in HEM.
In HEM the sequence is defined by the natural structure of the aspect tree.
- 14 -
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Figure 4: Schematic Representation of Sequential Choice Process in IHEM
on a Preference Tree.
There are, however, many situations in which the aspect structure is not a
preference tree and/or the sequence of decisions are not determined by the
aspects. For example, the aspect structure in figu-re 1 is noi a pcference tree
because the aspects, 'color' and 'B & W' appear on both the 'consoles' branch and
the 'portables' branch. In fact, figure 1 is more like a factoLial structure than
a tree structure. We expect such factorial structures to be common in mature
markets like television sets where the market has evolved such that competitors
have exploited all segments.
Even if the aspect structure is a tree, there may be external constraints
which force a sequential process that does not follow the tree. Consider the
faculty candidate who is constrained to a geographic area because of a spouse's
opportunities or the automobile owner who is constrained in a choice of service
stations because the automobile requires diesel fuel.
Even if no constraints are imposed, a consumer may wish to make choices
sequentially. Consider restaurant choice in an unfamiliar city. We often
simplify our decisions by first choosing price range, say high, medium, or cheap
eats, and then style, say French, Italian, German, American, Chinese, Israeli, or
Lithuanian. Such a choice process can be viewed as a set of (internally imposed)
constraints.
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We define an agenda as a sequence of constraints. In particular, an agenda is
a tree of objects such that at any node, say A in figure 4, the consumer must
choose among those branches exiting that node. We label the nodes to indicate the
order in which they are processed. For example, in figure 4, the agenda is
processed from the top down as indicated.
However, an agenda need not be top down. It can also be bottom up as shown in
figure 5.
Peking Garden Yantze River Cory's Friendly's Versailles Bel Canto
Figure 5: Bottom Up Agenda for Restaurant Choices in Lexington, MA.
In figure 5, we first choose the best restaurant in each class, say Yantze River
for Chinese, Cory's for American, and Versailles for other. We then choose the
restaurant for a night out by comparing the best with the best, in this case,
Yantze River vs. Cory's vs. Versailles. Such an agenda might be used by a
resident of Lexington, MA who is familiar with all six restaurants. On the other
hand, a tourist unfamiliar with Lexington, may process this tree with a top down
agenda. Notice that the processing sequence is a logical constraint not
necessarily a temporal constraint in the sense that all '1' nodes do not need to
be processed simultaneously. We only require that all '1' nodes be processed
prior to any '2' nodes.
We also allow agendas to be mixed. For example, a consumer may process all
bottom nodes, then the top node, and finally the intermediate nodes.
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We denote agendas by upper case script letters, A, B, C, ..., and represent
them by labeled diagrams such as figures 4 and 5. For top down agendas we use a
superscripted star, i.e., A*, and for bottom up agendas we use a subscripted
star, i.e., A*,. When an agenda is either all top down or all bottom up we can
represent the agenda more simply by nested sets. For example, {{x, y}, {v, w}
indicates we first choose among {x, y} and {v, and then within either { x, y}
or {v, w}. Alternatively, {{x, y}, {v, w},* indicates we first choose
among x or y and among v or w, and then compare the best with the best, say x with v.
Relationships to Choice ProbabiZities.
We illustrate first the relationship of EBA and HEM to top down agendas. Next,
we illustrate the. effect of bottom up agendas and then we investigate which choice
rules are affected by agendas.
Eimintion--Aspects (EBA) and Agendas. Suppose that a onsumer uses EBA
whenever he is presented with a set of choice objects, but we constrain him to
follow an agenda from the top down. For example suppose that T is partitioned into
A and B and we force the consumer to choose first among A and B and then within A
or B. Following Tversky and Sattath (1979) we assume that the probability of
choosing A from T equals the sum of the probabilities of choosing any object in A
from T. In our example, such a combination of constraints and EBA says simply:
P(xIA) - P(xlA)P(AIT) (7)
where P(xjA) P(ylT)
and P(xJA) and P(ylT) are given by EBA. (We can clearly generalize equation 7 to
more than one intermediate level. For example, see equation 5.)
To see that such constraints can affect choice probabilities, let T {x, y, v, }
let A = {{x, w}, {y, i} , and let the aspect structure be given by figure 6.
That is, x' = {a, 1} Y' ' (al I2}, v' ' {a2i, B1' and w' ({a2, 2
Notice that T is a 2 x 2 factorial structure. Then, after some algebra:
- 17 -
ll____al_·_CI__el__Y____ _ _ _____1111__1__111_____1----1_1___ -
III
P(wlT) = 12-2/ [al + 2) (1 + 2 ) (8)
whereas P(wl.A*) = (2 + 2 )(aOIl + 4 )/ (a* l + a2)(2) 
For example, suppose al = .251, a2 = 249, 1 = .499, and 2 = .001.
Then P(wlT) = .001, but P(wl A) = .125. Clearly, an agenda can influence
choice
x y v w
Figure 6: ExampZe Factorial Aspect Structure
Generalized EZimination ModeZ (GEM). Consider.the factorial aspect structure
i.. figure 6. (For example, al may equal 'consoles', a2 = 'portables',
l. = 'color', and 2 'B & W' as in figure 1,) If we apply the HEM equations,
n,uations 5 and 6, following the aspect structure, i e., A = {{x, y}, {v, } ,
Aiud defining the measure of a branch as equal to the sum of all aspects that are
,nique to that branch, then we obtain:
P(xlT) = P(x{x, y})P{x, y}IA) (9)
=( 0l _
NoCe that such a definition reduces o that used for preference trees because, by
definition, there are no aspects shared among branches of a preference tree.
We define a more general model, GEM, by equations 5 and 6, but we allow the
measure of a branch to be a general function of the unique and shared aspects of a
branch. The above definition is but one example where the shared aspects, in this
case, 1 and B2, have no effect on the probability of choosing a branch.
- 18 -
a2
To illustrate that the choice of how one computes the measure of a branch can
have an impact on choice probabilities, consider the aspect structure in figure 6
and the top down agenda, = {{x, y}, v} . Suppose a1=.03, a2 = .07
P1 =.80, and 82 =.10. Apply GEM with no consideration of shared aspects when
computing m({ x, y}) would imply:
P({x, y}UB*) = al + 82 (10)
( 1+ 82) + a 2
P({x, y} I ) > P({x, y} A ) as expected by the axiom of regularity and 82 enters
the calculation, but intuitively we would not expect the deletion of w to raise
P(xB*) from .3 to .6 as equations 9 and 10 suggest. More likely, we would
expect that 1, which can be obtained on both branches, would also affect P({x, y}B 3).
Perhaps we should consider shared aspects in computing branching prob-
abilities. For example, we might compute P({x, y}lB ) by including 81
thus:
P({x, ylj*)= 18+ ()
( + 2 + l) + e ' l)
where we have weighted the measure of 1 by a scale factor of e in the range
0 < < 1. If 8 = 0, equation 11 reduces to equation 10. However, if = 1
using the scale above, we obtain P({x,y}[ 3*) = .46 and P(x3B*) = .4, which
is a more reasonable increase in the probability of choosing x.
It is an empirical question as to how shared aspects affect branching
probabilities. Since equation 11 reduces to HEM on a preference tree for any
value of , we define HEM( ) as a special case of GEM when the measure of a
branch equals the sum of all unique aspects plus e times the sum of all shared
aspects. In section 5, we investigate the strategic implications of shared
aspects, that is, of .
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Bottom Up Agendas. In a bottom up agenda, we represent a choice set by its
best choice object, a processing rule often advocated by economists. Processing
proceeds much as an athletic team proceeds through a tournament. In particular,
for the aspect structure in figure 6 and the agenda, A = {{x, y}, {v, }*,
we compute equation 12 if the consumer uses EBA for any unconstrained choice.
P(x1A*) = P(x{x, y} )[P(xl{x, v} )P(vl{v, ) + P(xl{x, w}) P(wl{v, )] (12)
=( 11 \ al \ 1 \+ ( + 1 2 
1 +1 2 /[ 1 +a2 1 + 2 l + 1 +a2 + 2 1+2
Using a( = .051, a 2 = .049, 1 = .64, and 82 = .26, we obtain P(xA*) = .40
compared to P(x[T) = .36 which we would obtain via unconstrained choice. In this
case we see that a bottom up agenda enhances slightly the probability that the "best"
choice object, x, is selected. (x' = {al, 1} and al > a2 1 > 82'
hence, we call x "best",) We will see in section 5 that, in general, certain
bottom up agendas enhance "good" objects while making "bad" objects less likely to
be chosen.
For now, suffice it to say that bottom up agendas do affect choice and do so
differently than top down agendas. For example, with EBA on the above aspect measures,
P(xIA*) = .36, which turns out to be the same as the unconstrained choice, P(xlT).
Invariance. We have already shown many examples where agendas affect choice
probabilities. We might wonder whether agendas always affect choice probabilities
or whether there is any choice rule for which choice probabilities are not
affected by agendas. We call such unaffected choice rules invariant.
Consider the factorial aspect structure in figure 6. The example in equation
8 has shown that the agenda, A = {{x, w}, {y, v}}* affects EBA choice
probabilities. Similarly, if we compute HEM(O) for A , we obtain:
P(wIA*) = 1/2 ( t2 + 2 (16)
l+ a2 + f + 2
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which is clearly different than the expression for P(wjT) obtained in equation 8.
This example illustrates that, in general, neither EBA nor HEM (0) are invariant
with respect to top down agendas.
It is easy to see that for top down agendas, a cognitive processing model is
invariant if and only if P(xlT) = P(xfA)P(AIT) for any A whenever A is a subset of
T and P(xlT) is non-zero. However, this condition is Luce's (1959) choice axiom
which is the defining property of CRM. Thus, for top down agendas, CRM is the
only invariant decision model.
Consider the bottom up agenda, , - {{x, y}, {v, w*. Applying CRM to each
pair gives us:
P( l) u(x) \.r/v) + U(x) U(w)
V u(+ U(v u(V Vx+ (w x u(w) u(v) + w
which does not reduce to CRM model of
P(xlT) ' U(x)
u(x) + u(y) + u(v) + u(w)
Thus, not even CRM is invariant with respel- to bottom up agendas. Since EBA and
HEM( i) are equivalent to CRM when there is no overlap among the aspect sets of x,
y, v, and w, this example is sufficient to show that CRM, EBA, and HEM ()
can be affected by bottom up agendas. To date, we know of no decision rules which
are invariant with respect to bottom up agendas.
We state this result as a theorem since it is important conceptually even if
it is easy to prove mathematically.
Theorem Z (Invariance): The constant ratio model is the only
decision rule invariant with respect to top down agendas. On
the other hand, each of the decision rules, CM, EBA, and HEM(e)
can be affected by bottom up agendas.
Theorem 1 is encouraging. Agendas do affect choice. We should be able to
identify at least some agendas that affect choice in scientifically interesting
and managerially useful ways.
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Theorem 1 has an additional benefit because it provides a means to test
whether CRM is a reasonable descriptive model of behavior. That is, if no top down
agendas can be found to affect choice, then CRM is not eliminated as a decision rule.
If any top down agenda affects choice, then CRM cannot be the decision rule.
Behavioral Hypotheses - FamiZiarity
The preceding analysis introduced agenda constraints and illustrated their
effect on choice probabilities. In some cases the constraints will be imposed
externally, but in other cases, they will be the result of self-imposed
simplifications in cognitive processing. We close this section by setting forth
initial hypotheses as to when self-imposed agendas are likely to be used by
consumers. These hypotheses are empirically testable. While our analytic results
in subsequent sections do not depend explicitly on the validity of these
hypotheses, these hypotheses do serve to motivate and interpret self-imposed
agendas.
Top Down vs. Bottom Up Agendas. In figure 5 we illustrated bottom up agendas
with restaurant choice. Suppose you are a a conference in an unfamiliar city,
say San Francisco, and you are faced with a restaurant choice. You have not
experienced the various restaurants, but you have some idea as to what to expect.
You may first decide on a seafood restaurant because San Francisco is known for
seafood, then decide on one near your hotel, ask or read about nearby seafood
restaurants and make a choice. When you arrive at the restaurant you select an
item from the menu. This is clearly a top down hierarchical choice process.
Suppose instead you are at home and are faced with a restaurant choice. Since
you eat out often, you know what you are likely to order at each restaurant, i.e.,
the restaurant is represented by its "best" item according to your tastes and
taking prices into account. You compare these "best" items when selecting the
"best" seafood restaurant, and you compare the "best" seafood restaurant to the
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"best" Chinese reseaurant to the "best" Italian restaurant, etc. when making your
final choice. This is a bottom up hierarchical choice process.
Consider the hiring decision in the introduction to this paper. If there are
many candidates and the search cost is high, we would likely narrow the field by
deciding on an area of interest. On the other hand, if search cost is low as in
the case of few candidates, we might use a bottom up, "best" versus "best"
decision rule.
Similarly, if we are hiring at the "junior" level, we may be more likely to
use a top down decision process because we are uncertain, even after a campus
interview, how productive the candidate will be. At the 'senior' level we have
much better information on research and teaching productivity and may be more
likely to use a bottom up process where we compare, say, the best available model
builder with the best available consumer behavioralist.
In each of these anecdotes, the key variable is familiarity. In general, we
posit that:
When one is very familiar with objects or search cost is low, and
uncertainty is low, then a bottom up agenda will be favored. When one is
unfamiliar with the choice objects, and search cost is high, or
uncertainty is high, then a top down agenda will be favored.
One implication of the above familiarity hypothesis is that lack of
information will lead an individual to a top down choice process and could
conceivably lead him to eliminate an optimal choice object early in the
hierarchy. For example, suppose the "best" Seattle restaurant is not a seafood
restaurant or the "best" junior faculty candidate is not in the area we choose.
EBA vs. GEM. GEM computes representative measures to summarize the
attractiveness of a branch. Constrained EBA sums the probabilities of the
individual items. As with top down agendas, we expect representative measures to
be used more often when detailed information about the objects is unknown,
uncertain, or difficult to obtain. We posit that:
- 23 -
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For constrained top down agendas, GEM will be the operant rule when
detailed information is not available, while EBA will be favored
when detailed information is available.
In analyzing the familiarity hypothesis, it is important to recognize that
both GEM and EBA are paramorphic models of cognitive processing. GEM does not
necessarily imply that an individual uses the postulated arithmetic rule to
compute the measures, m(y), of each branch, but rather that the arithmetic
rule will provide a good estimate of the weight he (or she) will attach to each branch.
Thus, according to the familiarity hypothesis, an individual will assign weights
to branches based on limited familiarity. These weights will be similar to what
we, as analysts, compute by the GEM rules.
4. ASPECT STRUCTURES AND AGENDAS
We have already considered special aspect structures in the form of preference
trees such as the automobile example in figure 2. There is another class of
aspect structures that is important and which is also more parsimonious than a
general structure.
Consider controlled experiments where the researcher manipulates the choice
objects, product categories where features dominate unique brand images, and
product categories where manufacturers have exploited market segmentation by
offering all possible combinations of features. In each of these instances we
might expect to see factorial structures. For example, figure 7a is a factorial
structure which represents an alternative hypothesis about the automobile market.
In a factorial structure there is overlap among branches and that overlap is
complete in the sense that aspects are partitioned into groups such that each
object has exactly one aspect from each group and all possible combinations of
these aspects are represented in the choice set.
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Factorial structures (FS) occur often in marketing. For example,
applications of conjoint analysis in marketing rely heavily on factorial designs
(possibly fractional) for data collection. See review by Green and Srinivasan
(1979). Similarly, factorial experimental designs are used to investigate
consumer behavior theories. See Sternthal and Craig (1981). Some markets
naturally evolve as factorial designs as line extensions are introduced to fill
every market niche.
For example, one might describe instant coffees as 'caffeinated' versus
'decaffeinated' at one level, and 'regular' versus 'freeze dried' at another
level. See empirical evidence in Urban, Johnson and Hauser (1984). However, as
figure 7b illustrates, the entire coffee market may not be a factorial structure
because there are no freeze-dried ground coffees. (On the other hand, the first
two levels in figure 7b can be considered an FS for coffees.)
A..e hmrh; 1 bec
!se
compact
y z w r s t v
a) Factorial Aspect Structure for Automobiles
'einated
Freeze-
dried
z w t v
b) Instant coffee is a Factorial Aspect Structure,
but coffee is not.
Figure 7: Aspect Structures
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At this point it is worth digressing to recognize that the definition of
aspects may be only an approximation. For example, in the instant coffee market
there may be other differences between brands than those shown in figure 7b.
Taster's Choice may have a different color label than Folaer's and that
color may matter in consumer choice. By analyzing the instant coffee market as an
FS we are assuming that the specified features (aspects) dominate the features we
do not model explicitly. The validity of such assumptions can only be answered
empirically, but such assumptions do allow us to isolate and study agenda effects
recognizing that, in application, we might have to include other effects in our
analysis.
ConmpatibiZity
Theorem 1 shows that only CRM is unaffected by all top down agendas. But,
this does not mean that all agendas affect choice outcomes. For example, it is
clear that an agenda that matches, or at least does not disrupt, a GEM hierarchy
will. .t affect GEM choice probabilities. But how about EBA? EBA is not a
hie: .chical. processing rule but is instead a random access processing rule.
Inti.;:ily, we expect agendas to influence EBA probabilities.
But not all agendas do affect EBA probabilities. Consider the factorial
structure in figure 6 and the "compatible" top down agenda structure in figure 8.
First we compute an unconstrained EBA probability.
P(xIT) 1l 81 + 1 1 (13)
\l1 82 plcl2/ 1 + a2/ 1 + +2/
x y v w
ifure 8: 4aenda Structure "ComratibZe" with FactoriaZ Aspect Structure
in Figure 6.
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where we have assumed t1 + 1a2 + 1 + 2 = 1 without loss of generality.
Now we compute the EBA probability constrained by the agenda in figure 8.
P(xlA*) = P(x{x, y})P({x, y} T)
_ 1 +l +1 + 2 \
01al (l / i ) (14)
+ 21 \ + 2
They are the same: As it turns out, this result generalizes.
Following Tversky and Sattath (1979), we call two trees compatible if and only
if there exists a third tree, defined on the same choice objects that is a
refinement of both. For example, {{{x, y}, z}, {t, v, w}} and {{x, y, z}, {{t, v}, w}
are compatible since {{{x, y}, z}, {{t, v}, w}} refines both agendas.
On the other hand, {{x, w}, {y, v}} is not compatible with {{x, y}, {v, wI}
since there is no tree which refines both these agendas. Note that the degenerate
tree {x, y, v, w, ... }, implied by CRM is compatible with all trees on T. For
factorial structures, an agenda is compatible if each branch of the agenda corresponds
to dividing the factorial structure on the (factorial) groups of aspects.
Tversky and Sattath (1979) have shown that, in general, constrained top down
agendas do not affect choice probabilities if the aspect structure is a preference
tree and the agenda is compatible with the preference tree. We show in the
appendix that this result also holds if the aspect structure is a factorial structure
and the agenda is compatible with the factorial structure.
We also show the more surprising result that compatible preference trees and
compatible factorial structures are the only agendas that do not affect choice
probabilities. Except for specific choices of aspect measures1 , all
We can always find degenerate cases in which P(xJT) = P(xlA*) for some
choice of aspect measures. For compatible pretrees and FS's and only for
compatible pretrees and FS's, P(xJT) = P(xlA*) for all choices of non-zero
aspect measures. Define compatibility for non-tree/non-factorial when, for each
split due to the agenda, there is a set of aspects contained in each branch that
are contained in no other branch in the split.
other agendas will affect EBA choice probabilities. Even fractional factorial
agendas and incomplete factorial agendas similar to figure 7b will affect choice.
Formally,
Theorem 2 (Compatibiiitv): For an arbitrariZy chosen set of
aspect measures, a constrained top down agenda, A*, has no effect
on a family of EBA choice probabilities, P(xjT) for allZZ xeT, if
and only if either (Z) the aspect structure forms a preference
tree and A* is compatible with the tree or (2) the aspect structure
forms a factorial structure and A* is compatible with the factorial
structure.
The detailed proof to theorem 2 is long and complex. Basically, we first show
that EBA is algebraically equivalent to a hierarchical rule for preference trees and
factorial structures and only for preference trees and factorial structures. We
then show that a compatible agenda does not upset the hierarchical nature of the
calculation.
Theorem 2 is both interesting and uiseful. Consider the television example in
figure 1, which is a factorial strr.1;:,c_ r ih aspects 'consoles' versus
'portables' and 'color' versus 'B & , Fo£ ?,BA, theorem 2 implies that an
advertising campaign will have no a f t~ it attempts to influence consumers to
make decisons according to the hiel'ah d !i figure 1. Nor will a 'coior' versus
'B & W' campaign have an effect. Ho.-ever, a campaign encouraging the comparison
'color portables' to 'B & W consoles' will affect choice probabilities. Theorem 2
also cautions behavioral researchers o avoid agenda experiments on compatible
factorial structures if they wish to denfity agenda effects from observed behavior.
To date, we know of no aspect structures which are not affected by bottom up-
agendas.
Equivalence
Compare the calculation of P(xI' ) via HEM(O) in equation 9 to the
calculation of P(x T) via EBA in equation 13. Although the procedure by which we
calculate the choice probability differs dramatically, we obtain the same answer.
This is true despite the fact that HEM and EBA are quite different
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hypotheses about how a consumer processes information to make a choice. For
example, HEM is an explicit, sequential, top down decision process while EBA is a
random access elimination process.
The calculation in equations 9 and 13 were based on the factorial structure in
figure 5. It turns out that this result generalizes to all factorial structures
and, as shown earlier by Tversky and Sattath (1979), to preference trees. But the
result holds for no other structure.2 Furthermore, the result does not hold
when shared aspects are considered, i.e., when e is not zero. Formally,
Theorem 3 (Eauivalence): For an arbitrarily chosen set of aspect
measures, the generalized hierarchial elimination model and eim-
inavion by aspects yield equivalent choice probabilities if and only
if (Z) the aspect structure is a preference tree or (2) the aspect
structure is a factorial structure, 9=0, and the hierarchy associated
with HEM is compatible with the preference tree or factorial structure.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 3 is that HEM(Q) probabilities are
independent of the order in which aspect partitions are processed. (For- e o,
the order can be shown to matter.) Thus, if a researcher uses a factorial
structure experiment to investigate hierarchies and the subject(s) is using HEM(O)
or EBA, the researcher will not be able to identify the order of aspect processing
or the decision rule the subject is using by simply observing the choice
outcomes. However, the researcher may be able to identify orderings or decision
rules by other means such as verbal protocols or response time.
Furthermore, in a market that has evolved fully to a factorial structure, say
some automobile submarkets or the instant coffee market, managerial actions to
influence agendas will not depend upon the specific cognitive processing hierarchy
as long as EBA or a compatible HEM(O) applies.
2Except, of course, for specific choices of aspect measures. We seek the
result that holds for arbitrarily chosen aspect measures.
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Swaary
Theorems 2 and 3 illustrate the very special nature of preference trees and
factorial structures. For such aspect structures and only for such aspect
structures, compatible agendas do not affect EBA probabilities and these EBA
probabilities are equivalent to hierarchical elimination probabilities.
Theorems 2 and 3 do suggest that other agendas will affect choice
probabilities.
We turn now to an analysis of which agendas do affect choice probabilities.
5. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS ON FACTORIAL STRUCTURES
In general, agendas affect choice, but section 4 suggests that the effect
depends upon the type of agenda, the aspect structure, the decision rule, and the
measures of the aspects. To a marketing manager seeking to improve the probability
that his (or her) product is chosen, these are very important questions. For
example, if the manager wants to design an advertising campaign to influence
consumer agendas, that is, to influence to which competitive products his roduct is
compared, he (or she) will want to evaluate the likely directional effect of his (her)
campaign. If the directional effect depends only upon the aspect structure, not
upon the specific measures of the aspects, so much the better,
In this section we illustrate the strategic implications of agendas on 2 x 2
factorial structures. Such factorial structures serve to illuminate more general
results, but are sufficiently easy to visualize so as to not obscure the intuitive
understanding of agenda effects.
We begin with dissimilar groupings, a class of top down agendas that enhance a
lesser target object. We then illustrate bottom up agendas which enhance greater
objects. Finally, we explore the comparative implications EBA and HEM and the
effects due to shared aspects. Throughout this development, we assume the
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factorial aspect structure in figure 6, that is, x' {a l 1}, Y' = {al,' 2 }
v' = {a2' 31}' and w' = {a2' 2}'
Enhancement of a Lesser Object
Marketing folk wisdom suggests that perhaps it is always effective for a low
market share product to force a comparison between itself and a high market share
product. For example, there are many advertisements in which a 'cola' is compared
to Coca-Cola. A similar phenomenon appears to be true for the Pitney Bowes/
Savin/Xerox example. However, many automobile manufacturers go out of their way
to compare themselves to the low share, but prestige, products of BMW and Mercedes.
Consider the agenda, A , in figure 9 and suppose we choose the aspects such
that al > a2 and f1 > 2' That is, we choose the aspects such that the least
prefered object, w, is compared to the most preferred3 object, x. For example,
if a1 = .03, a 2 = .01, 1 = .81, and 82 .15 then P(w A) .08 and P(wIT) =
.04. The folk wisdom appears to be true for this example.
However, for the folk wisdom to be true for other choice objects in T, the
condition that y has a lower unconstrained probability than v should be sufficient
to assure that the probability of choosing y is enhanced by the agenda, A . In
this example, P(yTT) - .12 which is less than P(vIT) = .21. But, the agenda A
actually hurts y, i.e., P(y]A*) .09 which is less than the unconstrained
probability, P(ylT) .12. Thus, we have generated an example where it is not
effective strategically to compare a low share product to a higher share product.
x w y v
Figure 9: Dissimiar Grouping Top Down Agenda for Factorial Structure in Figure 6.
3Here we loosely interpret "preference" as the EBA probability.
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Fortunately, we can identify an interpretable condition where an agenda is
effective independent of the specific aspect measures. In particular, if we group
the object, w, in a top down agenda with that object, x, for which w is maximally
dissimilar but inferior, then the agenda will enhance the probability that w will
be chosen. This result holds independent of the specific aspect measures as long
as a1 > 2 and ,1 > 82' We state the result for a 2 x 2 factorial
structure, but in the appendix we show it generalizes for an Q-level factorial
and for more aspects.
Result (Dissimilar Grouping): For the factorial structure in
Figure 6, the top down agenda, A* = {{x, w},{y,v}}*, enhances the
EBA probability that the least referred object, w, is chosen and hurts
the EBA probability that the most preferred object, x, is chosen.
That is, P(wIA*) > P(wIT) and P(xIT) > P(xIA*).
For example, for the FS in figure 1, a campaign that encourages comparisons
between B & W portable televisions and color console televisions will always be
effective for B & W portables as long as 'color' > 'B & W' and 'console' >
'portable'.
We show in the appendix (Result 1.1) that the result holds even if there are some
additional aspects that are common to the two dissimilar objects. Thus, a manager
introducing a copier, w, which is "just as good as a Xerox" on some aspects and
(probabilistically) weaker on all other aspects, say the image of the brand names,
could increase w's market share if consumers could be encouraged to compare w to
only a Xerox. We recognize, of course, that such a campaign might be effective for
other reasons such as the comparison giving the lesser copier, w, a quality image.
Result 1 suggests that the agenda effect reinforces such image effects.
Enhancement of a Greater Object
Result 1 indicates how a marketing manager might use an agenda to enhance the
probability that a lesser object, w, is chosen. We now examine agendas that
enhance the stronger object, x.
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Anyone familiar with sports tournaments (tennis, basketball, soccer, etc.)
knows that "seeding", i.e., the selection of the tournament agenda, affects the
probabilities of the outcomes. Common belief is that the "right" seeding will
lead to the best teams finishing well and worst teams being eliminated early. The
"wrong" seeding leads to upset victories.
According to our familiarily hypothesis in section 3, we believe consumers
tend to use bottom up agendas when they are familiar with the objects. Our
intuitive belief might be that bottom up agendas are "good" decision rules. That
is, they lead to "better" choices in the sense that choice objects with better
aspects (higher aspect measures) are more likely to be chosen and "poorer" choice
objects (lower aspect measures) more likely to be eliminated.
In this section we illustrate that such intuition is reasonable, some bottom up
agendas alter choice probabilities to favor choice objects with better aspects.
However, just as in sports tournaments, this phenomena is operant only with the
"right" agenda. The "wrong" agenda can be counter productive and lead to "upsets".
To illustrate the effect of bottom-up agendas, consider the three possible
pairing agendas on a 2 x 2 factorial structure. Following our convention and
without loss of generality, we assume a 1 > a 2 and 1 > 82' The first
agenda, S = {{x, v}, {y, w},*, makes the first comparisons with respect to
products that differ only on a 1 and a 2 The second agenda, 3* = {{x, , {v, }*,,
makes the first comparisons with respect to 1l and B2. Finally, the third
agenda, C, = {{x, w}, {y, v}} , is analogous to top down dissimilar
groupings in that it "seeds" the best product against the worst and the two middle
products against each other. Finally, without loss of generality, assume
that (al, a2} is the more important aspect pair, i.e., al/(a1 + a2) > /(1 2)
These assumptions assure that the EBA ordering is::
P(xJT) > P(y T) > P(vlT) > P(wlT)
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We first examine the agendas, A., and B,, that are compatible with the
factorial structure. Intuitively, we expect that the agenda, A*, which first
encourages the "easy" comparison ( 1 vs. a 2), would enhance the "good"
products, x and y. We expect 3* to do just the opposite and enhance "upsets", v
and w. It turns out that this is indeed the case. In particular,
Result 2 (Bottom-Up Agendas): For compatible bottom-up agendas, A,
and B,, on a 2 x 2 factorial structure where P(xIT) > P(y T) > P(vIT) >
P(wIT), doing the easy comparison first (al vs. a2) enhances objects
with already higher probability and doing the difficult comparison
( vs1 . a2) enhances objects with lower probabilities. That is:
(Z) P(x[A,) > P(x T) > P(x B*)
(2) P(yA*,) > P(y T) > P(y[ B*,)
(3) P(vlB,) > P(vT) > P(vIA*)
(4) P(w ,) > P(wjT) > P(wIA*)
To il,lus:R;-:a tht :nttom tp agenda effect in another way consider the concept
of entropy, H() or ;.a ageada, d.
H(fn) -[P(xIl) 1 P(xIl) + P(yIj) In P(yiJ) P(v[|) in P(vlD)
+ P(wj) in P(w[I)l]
Entropy measures the uncertainty of the system. High entropy means that the
agenda tells us little about choice outcomes. (Entropy is maximized when all
choice objects are equally likely to be chosen.) Reductions in entropy can be
considered information and should be favored by consumers. See Gallagher (1968),
Hauser (1978) and Jaynes (1957).
Since A, makes probabilities more extreme, i.e., closer to 1.0 or 0.0, we
expect it to decrease entropy relative to EBA. Similarly, we expect *3 to
increase entropy. Formally.
Result 2.Z (Entropy): According to the conditions of Result 2,
performing the easy comparisons first decreases entropy and per-
forming the difficult comparisons first increases entropy. That is:
H(A*) < H(T) < H(*)
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By analogy to a sports tournament "seedings", we expect that a bottom up
dissimilar grouping, i.e., first matching the "best" product, x' = {al, 31 
with the "worst" product, w' = ({2a, 32} would maximize the probability of
choosing the "best" object.
As it turns out, (see Appendix, result 2.2) the dissimilar grouping agenda,
C,, may or may not enhance x relative to unconstrained choice. However, C,
never enhances x more than the best compatible agenda, A*. While at first
glance, this may seem counter intuitive, it does make good intuitive sense. The
first comparison in the best compatibleagenda, say x vs. v, is made with respect
to the most favorable aspect, in this case al vs. a2. The first
dissimilar grouping comparison, x vs. w., is made with respect to both aspect
pairs, al1 and a2 and X1 vs. 2. Thus, although 1 > 82, the
comparison with respect to 1 vs. 2 dilutes the strength of al vs. a 2. Hence,
according to EBA, x is more likely to be chosen over v than over w. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the best compatible agenda is better than the
dissimilar agenda. Furthermore, in the appendix we note that ,* may actually do
worse than unconstrained choice if 1 > o a2
In summary, our analyses of bottom up agendas suggest that marketing managers
with superior quality products can enhance the probability that their product is
chosen if they encourage consumers to use bottom up processing strategies and make
the easy comparisons first.
Result 2.1 also suggests that the consumer who wants to improve his decision
making with implicit agendas should use a bottom up agenda and make "easy"
comparisons first.
Shared Aspects and Processing RuZes.
Results 1 and 2 suggest when and how a marketing manager can use agenda
effects to the advantage of a product. We can also imagine situations where an
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advertising or salesforce presentation can influence consumers to use one or
another processing strategy. For example, Tversky (1972 a,b) suggests a number of
advertising strategies consistent with EBA.
In this section we focus on the relative strategic effect of alternative
processing rules, in particular, EBA and HEM(e). For ease of exposition and
without loss of generality, we label the first comparison in HEM(e) with ae
and a2. That is, for figure 6, A* = {{x, y}, {v, }}*.
For example, let l = *.4 and a2 5 2 .1, then by Theorem 3 we
know that the EBA and HEM(O) probabilities are equal because the HEM hierarchy is
compatible with the aspect structure. But what happens as e increases?
Calculating, we obtain:
P(xlA) = .64 for8 - O
P(xl) - .52 of3 ' 1/2
P(x If) = .48 .Je 1
Thus, it appears that the more the co".;^.: :onsiders the shared aspects, 81 and
82, the lower the likelihood that the "best"' product, x, is chosen. As it
turns out, for all 2 x 2 factorial strvctur.s, shared aspects hurt the products
that are better on the first comparison, x and y, and enhance the products that do
worse on the first comparison, v and w. Formally,
Result 3 (Shared Objects): For a 2 x 2 factorial structure with the
first comparison made with respect to a1 and a 2, and for al > -'
shared aspects in hierarchial processing, i.e., HEM(X), ennance those
objects which contain a2 and hurt those objects which contain al. The
effect increases as the importance of the shared objects increases, i.e.,
as e increases.
This result is best visualized -ith the graph in figure 10. By the equivalence
theorem, the HEM and EBA probabilities start out the same at e - 0, but as e
increases, the choice probability increases (decreases)4 whenever the choice
object contains a2 (a 1). (Assuming of course al > a 2.)
4The curvature is as drawn. Second order conditions are negative for
objects containing a2 and positive for objects containing a.
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consideration of shared aspects while the manager of product w, w' = {a2, 2 
will wish to encourage the consideration of shared aspects. Managers of "mixed"
products, y' (a1l, 2 and v' - {a2, g2, may or may not wish to
encourage shared aspects depending upon whether the a's or the 's are
considered first.
Hierarchical Elimination
Probability
EBA Probability
Object contains weaker
aspect
Object contains stronger
aspect
. ,.. - e
1
Figure 10: The Effect of Shared Aspects on Choice ProbabiZities. measures the
importance of shared objects.
Swmarry
Agendas and processing rules do affect choice probabilities. By understanding
their effects, the marketing manager can begin to generate strategies with which
to increase market share. In this section we have explored some of these effects
illustrating our results on 2 x 2 factorial structures.
In particular, our results suggest:
managers with a lesser product should encourage consumers to use a top
down agenda grouping together "dissimilar" products,
* managers with a greater product should encourage consumers to use a
bottom up agenda making the "easy" comparisons first,
* managers with a strong aspect, say al, should encourage consumers to
use a random access rule (EBA),
* if consumers do use a hierarchical rule, considering a vs. a2 first, managerE
with a strong aspect should encourage consumers not to consider shared aspects
* managers with a weak aspect, say a, should encourage consumers to use
a hierarchical rule, consider a vs. a2 first and place high weight on
the shared aspects S1 and 2. Finally,
I-"I-- .
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* consumers who wish to increase the likelihood that they will choose the
"best" product should use a bottom up agenda making the "easy" comparison
first.
These results are illustrative of agenda effects. We leave extensions and
generalizations to future research.
6. DOMINANCE AND REGUIARITY
The previous section considered strategic managerial implications. In this
section we explore more theoretical implications of agendas. In particular, we
show that agendas can cause two commonly assumed axioms of probabilistic choice
theory to be violated. Furthermore, we illustrate that such violations are quite
reasonable and should be expected.
Consider the following four vacations:
x: Japan via Japanese Airlines (JAL) with free drinks on he plane.
y: Japan via Northeast Orient (NW).
v: Japan via JAL, and
w: Hong Kong via NW.
If a person were choosing from the set, {x, y, v, }, vacation x dominates
vacation v and, hence, we would expect that no rational consumer would choose v
from the set, {x , y, v, w}. Indeed, with a random access rule uch as EBA,
the probability that v is chosen is zero. Structurally, with EBA, dominated
choice objects cannot be chosen because either the dominating aspect will be
chosen, or at some point in the decision process all other aspects will have been
considered and the choice will be x vs. v.
Such is not the case with agendas. Consumers may pay a price for simplifying
their decision rules with agendas.
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Consider the top-down agenda, {{x, y, {(v, w}*, shown in figure 11.
As we might expect, the right-hand branch {v, w}, has a non-zero probability
of being chosen and v has a non-zero probability of being selected from the
branch. Furthermore, such a choice makes good intuitive sense if the consumer is
using a two-step decision process. Suppose that, in January, a consumer must
choose a tour company and, in June, he must choose which of two tours to take. A
rational consumer might choose the {v, vw tour company to keep his options
open and maintain maximum variety. He would then choose vacation v if, in June,
he decides he would really rather go to Japan than to Hong Kong. He may even feel
that the sacrifice of free drinks is well worth the chance to delay his decision
on which country to visit. (Such a decision is analogous to the decisions made
by business travelers who avoid "supersaver" fares in favor of more flexible
regular fares.)
(7.
x: Japan via JAL y: Japan v: Japan w: Hong Kong
with drinks. via NW via JAL via NW
Figure II: Illustrative Agenda in which a Donminated Choice Object Might be Chosen.
Depending on the aspect measures, we can make this effect as strong as we like.
For example, suppose a l 'Japan', a 'Hong ong', 3 'JAL' 2 NW ,
y = 'free drinks', a .94 .008, 62 = .001, and Y .001. If
the consumer uses EBA, we get:
P(xfT) - .76
P(vlT) - .00
which is much as we would expect if, in June, he can still choose from the entire
choice set. However, if the consumer must use a hierarchical decision rule,
HEM(0), with the agenda in figure 11, we get:
·---4w. YIB I- --
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P(xlA*) = .02
P(v|A) = .93
which is again as we would expect for the "story" cited above.5
If agendas can cause consumers to violate dominance, we should not be
surprised to see agendas cause consumers to violate regularity. That is, we
should expect that with an agenda-based processing rule, the probability of
choosing an object, say v, can be enhanced by adding another object, say w, to the
choice set.
Consider again the two tour companies. Suppose that the first tour company
still offers the two Japan vacations, {x, y}, but the second tour company only
offers the one Japan vacation, v. Now both variety and the fact that x dominates
v favor the first tour company. Thus, as expected, even with HEM(0),
P(vl{{x,y}, v)*) = 0. However, as shown above, if the second tour company
adds Lhe option of the Hong Kong flight, the second tour company is favored and
t(vI{{x. y}, {v, w}} ) = .93 . Furthermore, this violation of regularity makes
go-od 4.'::ittve sense.
; ,i.Pe also the extent that the second tour company benefits by adding the
Hong k:nag trip even though there is only a 5% chance that it is chosen, i.e.,
P(wlA*) = .05. Their "market share" goes from 0% to 98% with the addition of
Hong Kong trip.
For empirLical evidence that regularity can be violated see Huber, Payne, and
Puto (1982). However, we note that their experiments appear to exploit perceptual
effects, not agenda effects.
In summary, agendas can cause dominance and regularity to be violated, but
such violations are intuitive and help us better understand the phenomena of
agendas.
5We get the same effect with HEM(1), but the effect is less severe, i.e.,
P(x *) = .44 , and P(v IA*) = .49.
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7. DISCUSSION, SUGGESTED EXPERIENTS, AND EXTENSIONS
Consumer choice behavior is by its very nature complex. Any attempt to study
it requires that we make tradeoffs between full complexity, i.e., modeling all
phenomena we can postulate, and parsimony, i.e., focusing on specific phenomena to
understand their role in complex decision making. In this paper we focus on
specific phenomena, agendas, and how they influence choice probabilities.
To study agendas we draw upon, but generalize, well known, empirically
documented probabilistic-models of consumer choice behavior. From this
theoretical base, we examine top down and bottom up constraints on consumer
choice, constraints that can be external or, perhaps, self-imposed. We show that
only one choice rule is not affected by top down agendas and that all of the rules
we review are affected by bottom up agendas.
Aspect structures inteLac. wish agendas. We show that EBA i unaffected by
compatible factorial structures and preference trees and only by those aspect
structures. Furthermore, EBA and HEM(O) yield equivalent predictions if and only
if the aspect structure is factorial or a preference tree.
Agendas can have strategic managerial implications. We demonstrate top down
agendas that enhance lesser objects and bottom up agendas that enhance greater objects.
Furthermore, depending upon the aspect structure and the strength of the aspects, we
illustrate that a manager may or may not wish to encourage consumers to consider
shared aspects.
Finally, we demonstrate that two commonly assumed axioms of choice, dominance
and regularity, can be violated due to agenda effects. Furthermore, such
violations are plausible and suggest viable managerial strategies.
We feel our results are scientifically interesting. By isolating agenda
effects we are better able to understand their implications. Our mathematical
results provide a framework with which to study these effects and suggest means by
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which to test our hypotheses and models. For example, results 1, 2, and 3 suggest
that certain agendas will influence choice in predictable directions. The clever
experimentor can use these results to test hypotheses about decision rules and/or
aspect strucutres or to infer indirectly the operant decision rule.
We feel that our results are useful managerially. Section 5 illustrates
selected agenda effects with 2 x 2 factorial structures, many of these results
are generalizable,and more results are obtainable. We have chosen those results
which illustrate the potential of agendas and which lead to a better intuitive
understanding of agendas.
We suggest below some potential experiments and extensions.
Experiments
We have developed our theory from a few simple hypotheses. Nonetheless,
our results make strong predic-ioas about behavior. Most of these predictions can
be tested experimeatally, For q-3ampJ-., versky and Sattath (1979) have already
demonstrated agenda effects,qn rfe ence trees, Their experiments had 100
subjects choose among tiples of gambles. Tn oae choice setting, subjects were
constrained by a compatible preference tree and, in another choice setting, by a
grouping of dissimilar objects, The results were as predicted and were replicated
with a second choice problem,
One interesting experiment to test our results would be to manipulate top down
vs. bottom up agendas. To induce a top down agenda, the experimenter can ask
subjects to first choose groups of objects and then choose within the chosen
group. To induce a bottom up agenda, the experimentor can ask subjects to first
choose objects from pairs of objects and them compare the "best" with the "best".
The experimentor would also collect data on unconstrained choice. By result 2.1,
the best bottom up agenda should increase entropy relative to the random access
rule while the compatible top down agenda should induce no change if the subjects
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are using EBA and HEM(O). The directional predictions of other theorems and
results can also be tested by such experiments. Alternatively, one can manipulate
the importance of shared aspects by emphasizing (deemphasizing) shared aspects in
the statement to the subjects of the choice problem.
Perhaps the most interesting set of experiments for future study are those
that test our familiarity hypotheses. Such experiments are more difficult because
familiarity must be carefully manipulated. With the right inductions and
manipulation checks, the experimentor can vary familiarity and attempt to measure
the choice rule and agenda (bottom up, top down, or random access) that the
subjects use. The experimentor might wish to use protocol analysis to measure the
dependent variable. Alternatively, he can use our theorems and results to infer
the operant choice rule and agenda through their effect on the directional change
in choice probabilities.
Extensions
It is possible-to generalize some of our analysis. We suggest some directions
and leave details to future study.
Aggregation. Tversky and Sattath (1979, pp. 552-554) develop an aggregate
interpretation of EBA where P(xlA) is the proportion of consumers who select an
object, x, from the choice set, A. They show in their Aggregation Theorem
(p. 553) that their aggregate interpretation is compatible with EBA.
Since our choice rules are generalizations of their choice rules, we can
consider the same interpretations for analyzing agendas. That is, we can
interpret choice probabilities as population proportions where the mechanism is
that consumers are heterogeneous, but that the aggregate effect of individual
elimination processes can be summarized with an EBA-like or GEM-like rule.
- 43 -
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Generalized Agendas. We have defined agendas with respDect to hierarchical
partitionings of choice sets, e.g., {{x, y}, {v, I4}. We can generalize
this definition by dropping the requirement that each level be a partition. For
example, we can allow the following generalized agenda: {{x, y, v}, {y, v, w},
{{x, , }} . This generalization allows us to visualize an agenda as a
directed graph with the universe, T, as its source and single objects, say x, as sinks.
Alternative Measures. We analyzed the effect of agendas on consumer choice
probabilities. The definitions of CRM, EBA, and GEM can be modified for alternative
measures that have related properties, i.e., that are greater than zero and sum to one
across choice objects. For example, CRM, EBA, and HEM can be defined for any intensity
measure such as constant sum preference comparisons. See Torgerson (1958) and Hauser
and Shugan (1980) for relevant axioms.
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APPENDIX
PROOFS OF THEOIRMS AND OTHER RESULTS
Throughout this appendix, we use Greek letters to denote both aspects and
their measures whenever this can be done without ambiguity. We begin with five
lemmas that simplify our proofs.
Lemma 1: Let T be a factorial structure (FS) with matched aspects,
{all a 12 ' "'lk} X {a21 ' 22 ' a"' 2k} x *'- x {Kl', a2' ***' a
Then, for all xET, elimination by aspects yields:
P(xlT) = , (X' ai n=) a)
where the aspects are scaled to sum to 1.0.
Proof. We proceed by induction on K, the number of levels on the FS. Without
loss of generality (wlog) let x' = {all, a 2 1, ... aK1}. Lemma 1 is clearly true
for K =1 qince P(xlT) = all/ a n since all elements of T have disjoint
an=l
aspect sets for K - 1.
Assume equation Al holds for (K - 1) and note that T is a (K - 1) level
FS. Then:
FS. Then:
K
P(xlIT) a il P(xIT ) =
i=l il
P(xIT)
ail If
i lQI
L1Lk
a,1 1
il l =1 aiT ( 1 i [=1 nl I)
[t=1 1 -1il j-1i
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K k
which completes the induction since I E a = 1 by the scaling convention.
i=l j- 
Lemma 2. Suppose that P(xjA)P(AIT) = P(xjT) for all x and A such that
xcAT where P(AIT) = YAP(ylT), then P(xIA 1)P(A A 2) P(A IT) = P(xT) for
xeA 1 and AAi+l where P(AiIAi+1) Z yAP(yIAi+l).
Yei
Proof. If P(xIA)P(AIT) = P(xIT) for all x and A such that xCT, then,
specifically, P(yIA 2)P(A 2 IT) = P(yjT) for all y such that YtAiA 2. Then
ZyEAlP(yA 2)P(A2T) = ZycAlP(yJT). Multiply both sides by P(xIA 1) yields
P(xA )P(A1 1 A)P(A2IT) = P(xIA1 )P(A1 IT) = P(xIT) where the last step uses the
hypothesis of the lemma. Finally, we proceed by induction to the result.
Leima 3. Suppose that P(xIT) = P(xJA 1)PA 1IA 2) ... P(A iA ) for some sequence
Al, ... An, such that An = T, AiC Ai+l and the cardinality of Ai equals i + 1.
Consider another sequence, B1, ... B , such that Bj = A and B j+1 Ai+t for some
t. Then P(xIT) = P(xjB 1)P(B1 iB2) ... P(BmlIT).
Proof. See Tversky and Sattath (1979), Appendix E, pp. 572-3. An alternative
proof can be constructed similar to that in Lemma 2.
Before proceeding to Lemma 4, we consider a partition of the choice set
such that T = AUBULx}. We define aspect sets from x and B's perspective. Here, xU
and Bu are the unique aspects of x and B, respectively; BxU are the aspects that
are shared by x and B but not by any element of A; xS are the aspects x shares
with at least one object in A but not with B'; B are aspects B' shares with A'
but not with x'; BxS are aspects B' and x' share with A'; TC is the
set of all common aspects. In set notation:
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U
BU
Bx u
sSx
Bs
Bx
TC
These definitions
X'
= {a L x', ca B', a A'}
=f3', Re B', A}
= { l x 'nl A'}
= {YIYc x', yB' yA'}
{= 16ex', 6eB', 6cA'}
= {XI XxnB nv4', XiTC}
={nlnez' for all zT}
can best be visualized by the following Venn diagram:
B'
Le a 4. Let x be a choice object and let
such that T AUBUx}. Let B = Bx} and
elimination-by-aspects with hierarchy {{x,
following condition, A2, holds:
A and B be sets of choice objects
let A be a constrained agenda for
B}, A}. Then P(xIA ) {>- P(xlT) iff the
E + I 8 r+ E XPB + U P(xj B)
aex yex XEBx VEBx u {}
E + s r P(YB) + I r P(y|B 1
13 B 6CB XcEBx YB J eBx yeB 
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I u + Z YP(xT)+ E s P(x|T) + E P(x IB+)
acx yt x Y ABx p BU (AZ)
+Ey E +E P(yYTI 1+ X ['ryP(yI'B)]
X'BU+ 6eBS [6 y~B P(Yt + 4 P(1T~)] X s yBe Bu + £ B ye: B XC L ye B J PeBx L yBJ
Proof. By definition, P(xA) = P(xlB+)P(B IT) = P(xlB+ ) . [P(xlT) + P(ylT)].
Thus, by rearranging terms and recognizing P(x[B +) + E P(ylB + ) = 1, we get
ye B
P(x IA) { P(x|T) if and only if yB
P(xB ) { } P(xlT)
I P(ylB+ ) -E:P(ylT)
y B y B
Finally, applying EBA to each term and using the aspect set definitions for
xU B Bxu x S B, and BxS we obtain condition A2. Note that T = B by
P '
definition and that pe Bx can affect the ratios in condition A2 because the
selection of p as the elimination aspect eliminates some alternatives in B but
not all alternatives in B. Similarly for XeBxS .
If B - {y}, a singleton, then BxU and Bxs will not affect the left side
of condition A2 and BxU will not affect the right side of condition A2. The
resulting condition simplifies to condition A3 for A* = {{x, y}, A} where we
have written yxS for Bx , y for Bu,'and y for B :
£ Ua + s Y e + Y P(xITy) + s AP(xIT)
aex YEX aex yCE x yx (3)
J + s 6+ P(YjT6 ) + - sYP(YIT )2y 6 Sey y Sy 66 XEyx
Leia 5. Let T and A* be defined such that A* = {B+ A}. Equality holds
in A2 for all xzB+ and zA and for all possible values of non-zero aspect
measures if and only if the aspect structure is (1) a preference tree or (2) a
factorial structure compatible with the hierarchy associated with A*.
- A4 -
Proof. (If preference tree equality holds.) If T' is compatible with {{x, B}, A}
then xS = Bs = Bx = 0. Substituting these relationships reduces condition A2
to an identity.
(If FS equality holds.) By the definition of compatibility for FS's, there
must exist some aspect (or aspect set) which is contained in all objects in B+ but
not in any objects in A. Wlog, let this aspect (or aspect set) be a11 and let
x' = {all, a 21, ..., aK } . For K = 1, B = 0, P(xlB+) = 1 and equality holds.
Suppose K =2. Then x = Bu = BxS = , BxU = {a} x {a21} and
BS = {a2 2 , a 2 3 ' ... a2k }. Since all is common to all yB , condition A2 reduces to
a 2 1 a 2 1 P(xlTa
= a21
r2
n2 a2n
n=2
k2
ni2 2n
n2
)
P(yJT )
y B a2n
Finally, P(xlT ) - P(yjT ) a /(Z a ) for a2n y' for K : 2.
a21 a2 n
T'hus, these
terms cancel and the equality holds since a2n Ey' for exactly one yR,/1' a2n
Suppose K> 2. Then x B = x= 0, Bxu all, Bxs {a2 1 ' i' ' aK1} 
and B8 = {a2 2, a2 3 , ... , a2k 2 a 3 2 , a 33, ... a3k3 ... a Sub qttuting
these terms in condition A2 yields:
P(x B
a.1
)
+ j
yB
-_ K
E al P(xI T
= =l 0az1
P(y JB )1
a 2.1 ] 12 n2 
)
yeB
P(Ya Tn) +
The above equation will be satisfied if P(xfT
a., 
I P(ylT ) - R 
ye B QaL1 yeB
) RP(xI B+ ) and
aLi
P(y[B+ ) for =- 1 to K for all yB, and if
.,1
P(CyT a ) ' R for 2 to K and n 2 to for all ytB, where R is
ye B al
some non-zero constant.
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K
E al
K n
1=2 n: 2aln
P(y T
ak1ye B
__
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Recognizing that B and B+ are (K-2)-level FS's whereas T and
a L1 ain a1
T are (-l)-level FS's we can apply lemma 1 yielding:
aY, n
P(xjB+ )1T P(x T ( a L_
2.1 ; j ii a. j
k. k.
l, nil n-l
Hence, for 1, P(xT (a11 a,)/ . P(xjB ) which satisfies the
above condition with R (aina For Z=1, B =T and a is common
across x and B. Thus, all can be shown to cancel from the EBA formulae. See
discussion in Tversky (1972). We show the other terms similarly. (Recognize
that the selection of an, n 1 conditions out x. Because all remaining aspects
are shared with T - B, the set B will be chosen with probability R.) Thus,
condition A2 holds for a compatible FS.
(Equality requires Pretree or FS). We rule out the trivial case where A
is empty or P(AIT) = 0. Wlog, assume the aspect measures on T' sum to 1.0.
Then the condition fr equality in A2 can be written in the form:
a + c + g a + ce + g
b + d + h b + df + h
where a = L a, b = u = g P(B ), h Z [BpZP(yIB+)
a X u '
c = y + , XP(xiB ), ce = E yP(xlT ) + xXP(xjlT), e = ce/c,
and d, f are defined accordingly. Note that a, b, c, d, g, h [O, 1] by
the scaling assumption. e, f [O, 1] since P(yfB) > P(YIJT) for all 
because B CT and EBA satisfies regularity. The above relationship is equivalent to
(a+g)d(f-l) + (b+h)c(l-e) + cd(f-e) 0.
Since the aspect measures can be chosen arbitrarily on the interval, [0, 1],
subject to scaling restrictions and since the above equation must hold for any
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choice of aspect measures, equality cannot depend on a specific relationship
between non-zero a, b, c, and d. Thus, the above relationship will only be
satisfied by an aspect structure which implies either (1) c = d = 0, (2) f = e = 1,
(3) c = 0, f = 1, (4) d = 0, e = 1, or (5) a = b = 0, f = e 1, and (i) g/h = c/d
or (ii) g = h O0. (Note that the cases (5)-(iii) g = h = 0, a/b = c/d and
(5)-(iv) (a+g)/(b+h) = c/d for non-zero a, b, g, and h would require special
relationships among arbitrarily chosen aspects and could not be satisfied by
structure alone.)
Case (1) implies xS = BS = Bxs = for all xT and associated B. This
implies a compatible preference tree.
Case (2) implies that P(xJT ) = 1 for ycx s, ZBP(ylT() = 1 for 6 BS, and
P(yl ) = P(yl B) for all XcBx and B . But this implies P(AIT ) = 0,
P(AIT 6) = 0, and P(AIT) = 0 and at least one of x , Bs, or Bx is non-empty
(else f = e = 0). Thus, all elements in A that share any common objects with
B' are dominated by some B . Finally; we rule out the cise where objects in
all A are identical to at least one object in B+ by the P(AIT) = 0 conditions.
Thus P(zjT) = 0 for objects, zEA, that share some common aspects with objects in
B+ . All other objects in A have aspects sets which are disjoint from x' and B'.
Thus case (2) is a preference tree.
Case (3) implies x = Bx = and ZBP(YIT 6) = 1 for 6eB s. Case (4) implies
B = BxS = 0 and P(xIT ) ' 1 for ycx. These are special cases of case (2).
Y
Case (5), f = e = 1. Let f e = R. This condition must hold for arbitrary
selection of aspect measures. By successively varying yx s we can show that it
must be true that P(xjT¥) = RP(xlB+) = R and P(xITx) = RP(xfB) for all yx s and
XEBxS. (Note Bx = 0 for a 2x2 factorial and xS 0 for a 2 factorial where
n > 2.) By similar arguments, P(yIT 6) = R and ZB P(ylTX) = R i P(ylB±) for
6 B and XEBXS . By hypothesis, equality holds in (A2), hence we can write
R=P(B|IT) for ~ex s UB s U Bx. Finally, since a=b=O, xU=Bu=O and
x U B U Bxs Bx = (B+) .
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Consider subcase (i), g/h = c/d. By definition, (a+c+g)/(b+d+h) 
P(xiB+)/ P(yjB+). By g/h = c/d and a=b=O, (a+c+g)/(b+d+h) = g/h, hence
z uP(xjB) 
IEBX + P(xB +)
= +
h E 1. E P(ylB+) Z P(yBB )
X BxU yeB yB
By hypothesis this condition must hold for arbitrary choice of the measures of
U, hence it must be true that P(xjB )/ P(yB+) = P(xlB )/ Z P(ylB) for
yeB V B
all ~pBx . Since does not affect these probability ratios, by the properties
of EBA, it must be the case that Uey' for all yB+ . Since peA' by definition,
B must differ from A by u-Bx . Since these conditions must hold for all yB +
and for all A, there must exist a complementary uIA'.
Putting together the condition that R=P(B|IT) for all xS U Bxs and that
pax, we can write x' as {, 1' 2' " } We then limit successively on
i xs U Bx until only V is left to consider. It must then be the case that
there exists A' C A' such that A' = {P, 1, .2 } Similarly for all
X- X -2 1 
yeB there must exist a matching A' in A'. Since the conditions must hold for
y
all x, y, T we can find a factorial match for every choice object. Thus,
the factorial is complete and compatible and.not fractional.
Finally, subcase (ii), g=h=O, is a degenerate case where BxU=0 and the
"factorial structure" splits on identical aspects.
Thus, the only cases where condition A2 can hold for all xT is if (1) T'
is a preference tree and A is compatible or (2) T' is factorial structure and
A is compatible. This completes the proof of lemma 5.
Theorem 1 (Invariance): The constant ratio model is the only decision rule
invariant with respect to top down agendas. On the other hand, each of our
decision rules, CRa, EBA, and HEM(), can be affected by bottom up agendas.
-AS.-
Proof. Both parts have been proven in the text. The first.part is true by
the definition of CRM, P(xlA)P(A[T) = P(xT) for all A. Counterexamples have
been supplied for the second part.
Theorem 2 (Compatibility): For an arbitrarily chosen set of aspect measures, a
constrained top down agenda, A*, has no effect on a family of EBA choice
probabilities, P(xIT) for all xT, if and only if either (1) the aspect structure
forms a preference tree and A is compatible with the tree or (2) the aspect structure
forms a factorial structure and A is compatible with the factorial structure.
Proof. By lemmas 4 and 5, P(xI A) = P(xjT) iff the aspect structure is a pre-
tree or FS and compatible with A = {{x, B} , A} . Lemmas 2 and 3 extend this
result to arbitrary compatible agendas. If a single-level agenda affects a
family of choice probabilities, then a multi-level agenda must also since we
cannot quarantee any ca:'- laion of effects except by fortuitous choice of the
aspect measures.
Theorem 3 (Equivalence) Fior an arbitrarily chosen set of aspect measures,
the hierarchical elimination model (HEM) and elimination by aspects (EBA)
yield equivalent choice probabilities if and only if (1) the aspect structure
is a preference tree or (2) the aspect structure is a factorial structure,
e = 0, and the hierarchy asociated with HEM is compatible with the preference
tree or factorial structure.
Proof. (Compatible pretree implies equivalence.) Consider a hierarchy com-
patible with a pretree. Then by lemma 5, equality holds in condition A2. Hence,
by lemma 4, we can write EBA as a hierarchical rule, i.e., P(xlB+) P(B+IT) = P(xlT).
HEM(O) is defined such that P(xB+) P(B+IT) P(xlT). Lemmas 2 and 3 assure
that this can be extended to multiple levels. Thus we need only show that
Ph(xIB+) =Pe(xiB ) and Ph(B IT) Pe(B+IT) where Ph(xIB ) is computed by HEM(O) and
Pe(xlB+) is computed by EBA. Define Ph(B IT), P e(B+IT) accordingly.
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Applying EBA yields:
P(xB) -I; + sY+ I u P(xfB+) + x sXP(xl /a +5
e yx EBx l Bx a B
Now on a compatible pretree, Bx = xS= Bs = 0 and for all PcBxU , pEY' for all
yeB . Thus PcBxu does not affect P (xIB+), hence Pe(xIT+) reduces to
e e
P((xx )/ a (BU3)]
ex C xU Bu
Finally, according to the definition of HEM(O), see equations 5, 6, 9, 10, and 11,
we have m(x) ' I , m(B) I uB, and
acx GE B
Ph( l (aEXi )l[(aeer: ( B^I )]\=ex ex Oa
Thus, P(xIB ) Ph(xiB ). Finally,
P(+ P(yIT) [ B+ a + u·'T I 
yB + e YB + aey PEBx acT
m(B )/[m(B ) + m(T-B )1 Ph(B IT) paralleling the argumenLs used to show
P (xIB + ) - Ph(xlB+). For an alternative proof see Tversky and Sattath, 1979,
e
Appendix B, pp. 568-570).
(Compatible FS implies equivalence.) At any level a compatible FS splits such
that a jX(B ' and (a In # j} (T-B+)' and {a nlm # Q, a ne(B+) '} is
contained in both (B+)' and (T-B+)'. Thus, for HEM(O):
Ph(B IT ) aQj/nC a~n
Applying the above equation iteratively yields
P(xjT) a x i; 1
which is equivalent to Pe (xT) as shown by equation (Al) in lemma 1.
(Equivalence implies compatible pretree or FS.) By lemma 5,
P(xiB) P(BfIT) = P(xlT) only if A = {{x, B} , A} is a compatible pretree
or FS. Thus, EBA will not become a hierarchical rule unless the aspect
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structure is a pretree or FS. Thus, except for fortuitous choices of aspect
measures, HEM and EBA will not be equivalant unless the aspect structure is
a compatible pretree or FS.
Result 1.1 (Dissimilar grouping on a 2k factorial structure): Let T = B (x, w}
be a factorial structure. Suppose for every Cilx' - x'nw', Ol > Ci/ where a2 is the
aspect matched to a1 and x' - x'nw' contains at least two elements. Then, the
*
constrained agenda, A = {{x, , B} , is an effective EBA agenda for w and a
counterproductive EBA agenda for x. I.e., P(wlA ) > P(wjT) and P(xiT) > P(xIA*).
Proof. According to EBA P(x A ) P(xi{x, w} )[P(x T) + P(wIT)]. Thus,
P(xIA*) < P(xlT) iff P(xl{x, w})/P(wl{x, w}) < P(xIT)/P(wlT). [Use P(wI{x, w}) =
1 - P(x|{ x, ).] Let I = {ifa ix' - x'fnw'} and let J = {ijaj2w' - w'nx'}.
Note that I = J since ailCX' is matched to a w'o Thus,
I ail
Now, by 1-.ma 1,
=. x' ,k~ IP(xlT) i EI , I I k i
i2 ° kjicI , kII k 
The second terms in the numerator and denomina;:; cl.,il ;i.nce {akjlakfx', k I} =
{akjlakfw', kI} by the hypotheses of the th ,em ::,' ,e must show that
Xail < aQi
i-,
iLi 2 TTa12
where ail > a i2 > 0. (All sums and products are over the set, I.) Because all
terms are positive, this condition reduces to Zji(a ia1 - ai Laz12) > 0.
Rearranging terms yields Pif Qi2 /q1 i, -I LZ 2) > 0. This condition holds
whenever {flk¢I, L#i} # a which is true whenever I contains
at least two elements. Since the condition holds, we have shown P(xlA ) < P(xIT).
The proof for P(wj A) > P(wjT) is symmetric.
-All-
Result 1 (Dissimilar Grouping): For the factorial structure in figure 6, the
top down agenda, A , {{x, , {{y, v, } , enhances the EBA probability that the
least preferred object, w, is chosen and hurts the EBA probability that the most
preferred object, x, is chosen. That is, P(wlA*) > P(wJT) and P(xlT) > P(xlA*).
Proof: Result 1 is a special case of Result 1.1 with k 2.
Result 2 (Bottom-Up Agendas): For compatible bottom-up agendas, A* and * on a
2 x 2 factorial structure where P(xjT) > P(yfT) > P(vIT) > P(wfT),
doing the easy comparison first (a1 vs. a2) enhances objects with already higher
probability and doing the difficult comparison first ( 1vs. 32) enhances objects
with lower probabilities. That is,
(1) P(xlA*) > P(x|T) > P(x|3*)
(2) P(y[A*) > P(ylT) > P(yl[,)
(3) P(vlB*,) > P(vlT) > P(vIt%)
(4) P(wlB*) > P(wJT) > P(wIA*)
Proof. For x' = {, } , ' (a, 2 ' a' }, w' = {(2' 2 the
conditions of the result translate to a > a 2, 1 > 2 and al/(al 2) > 1/(1+ 2)
According to the definition of bottom-up agendas,
P(xl.*,) - P(xlxy)[P(xlxv)P(vlvw) + P(xlxw)P(wlvw)]
P(xlA*) - P(xjxv)[P(xjxy)P(ylyw) + P(xlxw)P(wyw)]
where we have used the shorthand notation P(xlxy) for P(x|{x, y}), etc.
Introduce the notation, p P(xlxy) P(vlvw) 1 - P(wlvw) = +1/(81  82);
q = P(xlxv) P(ylyw) 1- P(wlyw) -ae/(a 1 4a 2 ); and r = P(xxw) 
(a s1 3l)(a+1l3-x 2 +132). By the conditions of the theorem, q > p. Furthermore, it
is easy to show q> r> p.
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Using our notation, P(xlA*) = q[pq + r(l-q)], P(xB3*) = p[pq + r(l-p)],
and, by Lemma 1, P(xlT) = pq. Rearranging terms yields P(xlA*) = pq + q(l-q)(r-p)
and P(xIB*) = pq + p(l-p)(r-q). Thus, since (r-p) > 0, P(xA*,) > pq = P(xlT) and since
(r-q) < 0, P(x!B*) < pq = P(xlT). This completes the proof of part (1). We show
the other conditions similarly. For example, P(y|A*) = q(l-p) + q(l-q)[t - (l-p)] >
q(l-p) = P(ylT) where t = (al +3 2)/(a 14 2 ++ 2).
Result 2.1 (Entropy): According to the conditions of Result 2, performing the
the easy comparisons first decreases entropy and performing the difficult comparisons
first increases entropy. That is: H(A*) < H(T) < H(B3).
Proof. It is sufficient to show that (aH/aA) < 0 where A is some function with
the properties a Px/aA > 0, a py/aA > , a p/a < , a pw/A < 0, and
Px > Py > Pv > P, where p P(xIA*), etc. Using this notation, H(A) -
-pxlnpx -p lnpy -PvlnPv -pwlnp . Using the chain cule for differentiatioa yields
a H -lnpx a px -lnpy ap lnpv a -lnPw a p w
aKA A aA aA aA
Where we have used a (p + Py P : p )/a - 0.
Recognizing - pv/A a (px + Py + Pw)/aA and substituting yields:
aH (P1 ap Py aP_ aPW
aA ,/ aA \Pv aA P aA
Finally, by inspection we see that all terms are negative.
Result 2.2 (Bottom-up Dissimilar Agendas): For the dissimilar grouping agenda,
C*, on a 2 x 2 factorial structure with P(xIT) > P(ylT) > p(vlT) > P(wlT),
and a/ l 2 ) > l/(1 +2) 
(a) P(xl
. ) > P(xlr) iff a 2 > B1l2
(b) P(xlA*) > P(x1) > P(xl3*).
Proof. We continue with the notation of result 2. Let s = P(ylvy) =
(a1+B 2)/G 1+1-f+2+3 2) = a 1+ 2 where wlog a 1+ 1++a 2+3 2 1. Then according
to the definition of bottom-up agendas,
P(xlQC) P(XIxw)[(P(xIxy)P(y yv) + P(xlxv)P(vlyv)]
or P(xlC) = r[ps + q(1-s)]
Thus, P(x!,) > P(xlT) if
~l+'l) +SZ) ( ' X+ 62+1) al ]> ' 1 [2](a11B (a11i3 2 + (a2 i3 a 1 > a 1 *
which after much algebra reduces to,
a 2LS(a2 - a231) > 3l2aL ZL - a 21)
Finally, since a l/l(a1- 2) > 31/(B1+32), we have a113 2 a 2 1 > O hence under
the conditions of the theorem, P(xIC*) > P(xlT) iff af2 > 132 · Note that if
31/(1+2) > al/(a1ii 2), the appropriate conditif is 2lB2 > ala2.
(Part b.) To show P(xIA,) > P(xl) we must show q[pq + r(l-q)] > r[ps + q(l-s)]
where p, q, r, and s are defined above. After much algebra, this condition
reduces to al12 > a 2 31 which is true since a / 1 x2) > /(+ 2) We show
P(xlC,*) > P(xB*) by symmetry.
Result 3 (Shared objects): For a 2 x 2 factorial structure with the first
comparison made with respect to al and a2, and for a1 > a2, shared aspects in
hierarchical processing, i.e., HEM(O), enhance those objects which contain a 2
and hurt those objects which contain al. The effect increases as the importance of
the shared objects increases, i.e., as 9 increases.
Proof. By definition
P(xl T) al 1 \+ a1 a 1 a 113 1
P(x I A*) vk 1 \)/a l + (l2)'
\31 1 3} alF2+ 2 ( +E2 
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First we recognize that P(xiT) = P(xfA*) for = 0. Next, taking derivatives
of P(xlA*) yields:
ap = B1 . 1a 2+2e01) - 23(ca +e3)1
Be (a la 2+2eB)2
where = (+3 ). After some algebra, this condition reduces to
aP = (constant) . ( 2-C1) (A4)
where the constant is positive. Thus for 2 < al, a P < 0, hence
ae
P(xlA*,E>0) < P(xjA*, = ) = P(xIT).
If we reverse B1 and 2 we see the same result holds for y' = {a1,3 2}. If we
reverse al and a2 we have the results for v' = {a2,3 1} and w' = {a2 32} because
the decivai:ive is now positive. Because A4 is negative for > 0, we have shown
also the l-si statement that he effect increases as e increases.
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